Posted on January 18, 2013 by Ian Garner
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies-NESA
National Defense University-Washington, D.C.
French intervention in Mali has
proceeded apace as French troops begin a ground assault on
extremists in the North. However, at the same time that France is making a push
in Mali, Algeria is suffering from a terrorist attack targeting one of its gas
plants 60 kilometers from the Libyan border. Reports are mixed, but it is clear that the Algerian military has
launched a strike that has freed the majority of the hostages, although the
attempt also led to the death of many hostages as well. As it stands, militants
in Algeria claim that they are still
holding 41 foreigners.
What is also clear is that Algeria
did not collaborate with foreign governments whose citizens were held hostage, including the United States.
Algeria did not inform potential partners of its plans nor did it accept offers of assistance. The question, then, is why did Algeria not accept any of these
offers or even at least inform is counterparts that an assault would be
attempted?
The answer to this question lies in
Algeria’s historical legacy. Algeria’s political identity was formed in the
fire of a violent revolution against France. The struggle against colonialism
has left an unwillingness to engage in multilateral interventions that was only
enhanced by the civil war of the 1990s. Additionally, the scars of the civil
war have left a mindset in the Algerian military that they must do whatever it
takes to put down militants and rebels, whatever the consequences. The 1990s
was truly a desperate time, full of massacres and atrocities committed both by the government and militants. During the 1990s
Algeria learned from Hafez Al Assad the way to put down rebellions. Hafez Al Assad would have been a
likely target to learn from, given that he had crushed a somewhat similar
uprising in Hama as the Algerians believed they were then currently facing. Some claim that
Algeria has, more recently, lent their advice and lessons learned fighting
their civil war to Hafez’s son Bashar Al Assad as well as advising Ben Ali
before his ouster in Tunisia. Algeria also voted
against the imposition of a no-fly zone
during Libya’s revolution. This assistance to regimes in danger is indicative
of Algeria’s distaste for foreign intervention as well as its belief in the
sovereignty of a government to control what occurs within its borders.
Suffice it to say that it is clear
that Algeria is both uneasy with foreign intervention and has a belief that it
knows exactly how to deal with militants. In the eyes of the military, even if
it was brutal, Algeria did eventually crush the Islamic militants that
struggled against the state in the 1990s.
In a previous post I
argued that Algeria’s feeling of discomfit with interventions may have
unforeseen circumstances for the intervention in Mali. While Algeria has
granted France the use of its airspace in order to allow French air raids in Mali, the current hostage crisis demonstrates that Algerian
cooperation is unlikely to be comprehensive. It is critical that the French and
Algerians come to an understanding regarding strategic goals and tactical
methodology in Mali.
Algeria and Mali have a very long
border. The hostage crisis demonstrates that militants remaining in Algeria are
influenced by events in Mali. It also shows that Algeria will not defer to
outsiders when dealing with issues within its borders. Looking for a silver
lining here, perhaps the Sahel crisis is an opportunity to create a new
understanding between Algeria, its neighbors, and the wider international
community – including the United States. It will take some very difficult
diplomacy and a rethink of longstanding ideas, both on the part of Algerians
and the rest of the world, but perhaps some good may come from this tragedy.
Please note that the views expressed in this piece do not
represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University,
the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.