By Maameri
Fatiha
Revue Sciences
Humaines n°29, Juin 2008, pp.39-50
Université
Mentouri, Constantine, Algérie, 2008.
Abstract
This article accounts for and
analyzes relations between Algeria and the United States of America during one of the
lesser-known periods in the modern history of Algeria, i.e.: the period 1783-1816.
It is an attempt at understanding the nature of those early contacts and their repercussion on
present times. For the purpose, the first part of
the article gives an historical overview about the general conditions that prevailed at
the end of the 18th and early 19th centuries and subdivides the period into two
phases. The first phase was dominated by peaceful negotiations that aimed at
concluding a treaty of peace and obtaining the release of American prisoners at Algiers.
The second, however, features a naval encounter between the flagship of the Algerian
navy and the American Mediterranean squadron, which ended by forcing a second
treaty more advantageous to the United States on the Dey of Algiers. In its second
part, and from a different angle, this article looks at the so-called Barbary pirates’
episode as it was dealt with in American historical writings and attempts to reassess
those early relations as objectively as possible.
Introduction
Relations between Algeria and the
United States of America may be subdivided to five major chronological periods:
The first period extends from the independence of the United States in 1783 to the
establishment of French colonial rule in Algeria in 1830. This period was
characterized by intensive diplomatic and naval
activities that resulted in numerous
naval attacks, European and American, on the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.
Eventually, those led to the conquest of Algeria. The
second period covers almost the full colonial era. Whatever small contacts survived, and they were commercial
for the most part, the United States dealt with them mainly within the global context of
French colonial rule. This may be explained by the geographical remoteness of the
United States and its isolationism under the Monroe Doctrine, 1823, which discouraged
any American involvement abroad.
A third phase in Algerian-American
contacts opened at the midst of the Second World War with the Allied forces’
landings on North African shores in the fall of 1942. It was a relatively short phase but
meaningful with its intense events. The region then fell strictly under American military
strategic considerations. This period is well distinguished by American
misunderstandings—if not total lack of interest—of the growing nationalist sentiment
in Algeria. Distorted images about the native population intensified during
that period also. So far, when compared to previous phases, WWII allied
landings remain the most investigated period by Algerian scholars i. Hence, various
new interpretations have contributed further and better understanding towards
those wartime relations.
A Cold War approach overshadows the
fourth major chronological phase in Algerian-American relations. This
period extends from the end of WWII to the early 1990s, time at which the
Soviet Union disintegrated. This period brought about numerous vicissitudes in
bilateral relations. Thus, in their preoccupations with the Cold War and
attempts at containment, the Americans tended often to confuse nationalism
in Algeria with communism. That confusion, for the most part,
generated tensions between the two antagonists.
In addition, America’s rise to
globalism and world leadership was incompatible with the free-minded character of
Algerians; therefore, it contributed further uneasiness. The resulting attitudes
are reminiscent of those late eighteenth century clashes. Overall, however,
relations remained fairly flexible and balanced.
One may also consider the
development a fifth phase in these relations starting from the early 1990s up to
these days. The rise of an Islamist movement in Algeria caused a
two-fold American approach toward the
country: first, and for American
security reasons and economic interests, the Americans
favored a policy of cooperation to combat ‘Islamist terrorism.’ii
At the same time, and particularly
since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center (2001), Americans revived
old-new attitudes that tend to assimilate the so-called ‘Algerine pirates’ to
‘Muslim terrorists’ and vice versa. An unconsidered amalgam between piracy,
terrorism, and Islam led to further distortions of Algeria’s image in
American writings.
- Algerian-American Relations: A Historical Account
Relations between Algeria and the United States go back as
far as the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Algeria then was an Ottoman
province that was striving to thwart Christian attacks on its shores. The
struggle resulted in naval clashes with European navies and privateers—called
also corsairs in the Mediterranean area—which, to some extent, affected
American trading interests in the Mediterranean.iii
Consequently, while seeking
lucrative markets, the emerging Republic of the United States negotiated a
treaty of peace with the Dey of Algiers and appointed consuls.
Those early contacts, however, were not
free from strains and antagonisms.The first treaty was signed in 1795;
but for different reasons, it failed to maintain peace between the two
countries. In 1815, the United States declared war on Algiers, a war that
apparently was a response to an Algerian declaration of war on the United States in 1812.
The war, however, was short-lived. Apart from a brief naval encounter between
an American squadron composed of 9 warships and the Algerian flagship
under the command of Rais Hamidou, no further hostilities occurred. The
Dey accepted the terms of a second treaty as soon as the American squadron
reached the port of Algiers. The situation as it presented itself in 1815 was the
culmination of four decades of diplomatic tensions and maritime troubles.
•The First Phase, 1783-1812
Up to 1776, and as British subjects,
American colonials’ ships sailing in the Mediterranean Sea benefited
from the Anglo-Algerian Treaty of Peace and Commerce of 1682.iv The colonial
vessels then carried passports delivered by British admiralty courts which
permitted them free navigation in the Mediterranean. When the Americans
declared their independence in 1776, they paradoxically continued to fly the
Union Jack and thus continued to benefit from British protection even though
they did not carry proper passports. By 1778, American commissioners at
Paris attempted to include a clause in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with
France that would give them the same privileges enjoyed under the British
treaties with Algiers. However, they could obtain no more than the promises of
the king of France to use his ‘good offices’with the Dey of Algiers.v
Other attempts from the Continental
Congress for access to Mediterranean markets under the flag of other
European powers were also thwarted. Moreover, upon achievement of
independence, the Anglo-American treaty of peace of 1783 discontinued all
privileges for American shipping, a fact which put American trade in the
Mediterranean area in a critical condition.vi
One of the reasons which may explain
such a conduct was that the European powers feared American commercial
competition; therefore, they declined giving any support to American trading interests in the area. American
contacts with the Ottoman regency of Algiers, one of the naval powers on the southern flank
of the Mediterranean, started after American independence. In 1785, Algerian
corsairs captured two American merchantmen that were sailing in the Western
Mediterranean.vii
Both vessels had no passports, a
condition for passage in the Mediterranean which was provided by treaties between Algiers
and the different European countries, which legitimated their seizure.viii
According to the general maritime
practice of the time, their 21-men crews were imprisoned and subsequently
enslaved.ix
Thus, started a period in the
history of Algerian-American relations that continues to stand up today as a
symbol of aggression and terrorism. x
In 1786, negotiations for the
conclusion of a peace treaty between Algiers and the United States and redemption of American captives
failed partly because of financial problems of the Confederation Congress. In
1793, following a truce with Portugal negotiated by the British consul at
Algiers Charles Logie, Algerian corsairs captured further American ships and
took 115 prisoners.xi
Starting from 1789, under a new
Constitution and a new government, Congress could levy taxes; therefore it
could raise the funds necessary for negotiating a peace treaty. Some time,
however, elapsed before a treaty was successfully negotiated with Algiers. By
the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1795, the United States agreed to pay an
annual tribute in the form of naval stores; in return, it obtained large
trading and naval privileges and secured the release of prisoners.xii
Even though tribute and ransom were
an integral part of the laws and usage of nations at that period, today they
are largely condemned in American writings.xiii
However, considering the economic and naval advantages the Americans
obtained, one may consider that the terms of the treaty profited more to the
United States than to Algiers.xiv
Overall, the treaty managed to keep
peace between Algiers and the USA until 1812.During the early decades of the American
republic, the differences with Algiers over prisoners and tribute were used as
arguments for correcting American constitutional deficiencies.
Thus, the federalists skillfully manipulated
the captures of 1786 and 1793 towards the adoption of a new constitution and
creation of a navy. Today, American historians argue ironically that,
indirectly, the ‘brutal’ policies of the Dey of Algiers culminated in the birth
of the American Constitution and accelerated the raise of the U.S. Navy. Thomas
A. Bailey, an authority in American diplomatic history, imputed
America’s dropping of the “toothless Articles of Confederation” in 1787 to the ill-treatment of Americans by the ‘Barbary pirates’ and considered
that “the brutal Dey of Algiers was a founding Father of the Constitution.”xv
Likewise, troubled relations with
Algiers, especially after the capture of more vessels in 1793, led to the
foundation of the American Navy.xvi
In January 1794, the American
Congress adopted a resolution authorizing the construction of “a naval force,
adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the
Algerine Corsairs.”xvii
Later, Congress provided funds for
the building of six frigates; it was the beginning of the U.S. Navy.xviii
Hence, and indirectly too, the Dey
of Algiers might as well be considered a founding father of the American Navy.
It is true that the act of 1794, providing for the foundation of the Navy, sprung
from federalist and merchant class demands to take a naval action against the
Barbary Coast states to secure American interests in the Mediterranean but the
European wars and subsequent British and French restrictions on American
commerce in the Caribbean and elsewhere were of no less
importance.
•The Second Phase, 1812-1816
The second phase opened with the War
of 1812 between the United States and Britain. Partly because of instigations
from the British consul at Algiers and partly because of American failure to
respect the terms of the treaty, particularly the annual payments in naval
stores, the Dey ordered the American Consul General to leave Algiers in July
1812. The Dey also threatened to repudiate the treaty and declare war if the
United States would not respect its engagements under the treaty of 1795 within
the limit time specified by the treaty (2 months). The United States simply
ignored the ultimatum; two months later, Algerian corsairs captured another
American ship and took 11 prisoners, thus opening hostilities with the United
States. The Americans, now increasingly powerful, could not accept that a small
country would challenge them in the Mediterranean and considered action of
Algiers as deliberate aggression against the United States.xix
The circumstances that prevailed at that
time made the declaration of war on the United States necessary: according to
diplomatic and naval practices, treaties were negotiated on the basis of
tribute and passports secured safe passage in the Mediterranean for all
belligerents. By declaring war, the Dey was no more than abiding by the laws
and practice of nations that prevailed then; perhaps also he hoped to press the
United States for payment of dues in arrears. That declaration of war was
vehemently recommended by prominent Jews, particularly the Bacries, who were
highly influential in the Deylik spheres.xx
Moreover, Great British played a no
less important role in stirring troubles between Algiers and the USA. Already
on a war-foot with the United States, the British convinced the Dey to declare
war while assuring him of Britain’s support. Three years later, at the end of
the War of 1812 which pitted the USA against Britain, the American
Congress declared war on Algiers. When the American squadrons showed up at the
port of Algiers in June 1815, the Dey summoned the British consul and blamed
him for pretending “that the Americans would be swept from the sea in six
months by [the British] navy” and allegedly added: “now they make war upon us
with some of your own vessels which they
have taken.”xxi
Previously, Britain had guaranteed
Algiers protection in a letter from the Prince of Wales, countersigned by Lord Liverpool,
dated January 1812 and addressed to the Dey shortly before the irruption of the
War of 1812.xxii
Finally, Americans’ non-observance
of the terms of the treaty of 1795 caused the Dey to declare war. In terms of
payments in the form of naval material, the Americans failed to provide them in
due time and most often they did not respect the requirements of the treaty
relating to quantity and quality.
Accordingly, the direct cause that
led to the war declaration was an annual payment, brought by
USS Allegheny in July 1812, from
which powder and cables were missing. Considering it a personal humiliation,
the Dey ordered the American Consul Tobias Lear to leave the country.xxiii
Although the Dey was too sure about
the strength his own navy and too confident in British guaranties, he fell into
dangerous miscalculations that were going to cause the Regency a great deal of
losses. Nevertheless, and in all cases, he could not have predicted an American-British
war that would have caused the withdrawal of the British fleet from the
Mediterranean. Nor could he foresee the indecisive end of that war and the
return of the American fleet to the Mediterranean with instructions
to attack Algiers and conclude a new treaty more favorable to the United States.
Thus, in March 1815, The American Congress declared war on Algiers. Two
squadrons under the command of Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge were
dispatched to Algiers with instructions for signing a peace treaty unconditionally.
Rais Hamidou and the Dey were caught unprepared for that war.
The first was killed while valiantly
fighting against a full squadron—his single vessel the flagship Mashouda resisted
during 4 hours a combined attack of 9 American vessels before a canon-ball hit him—and the second
signed a peace treaty at the mouth of canons.xxiv
The treaty of 1815 guaranteed the
Americans an advantageous commerce with Algiers without the payment of tribute.xxv
2. Algerian-American Relations
Reconsidered
Standard American writings dealing
with this early episode in Algerian-American relations reflect, in most cases,
a one-sided and biased perspective. Interpretations usually approached
relations with Algiers from an American angle and did not bother investigating
the rationale of the other side; when not so, it was un-emphatically done. What
is common in American writings is the heavy reliance of
historians on American sources only. Those fall under three major categories:
Journals and letters from the Continental Confederation
congresses in addition to the journals of Congress (House and Senate after
1789); American state papers relating to foreign relations of the USA; and
finally, letters, journals, and memoirs of those who were event-actors such as
statesmen (presidential papers for example), consuls and special agents, ex-prisoners,
and naval officers. The approach American historians have adopted tends to deal
with the different aspects of relations with Algiers from purely American
ideological, political, commercial, and naval angles. Though these are
essential to the understanding of the general circumstances and conditions that
shaped early Algerian-American relations, they are in
sufficient. In search of the
absolute truth, if such a truth could be revealed , one should consider investigating
all parties involved in the historical event including Turkish rulers of
Algiers, their system of government, beliefs,
motivations, and goals. Only then may one be able to pretend to an objective
study of those relations. Standard American literature utterly failed to
attribute anything decent to the Regency of Algiers and its navy.xxvi
While privateering was an acceptable
practice for Americans and Europeans, it was tagged ‘piracy’ when practiced by
Algiers. In sum, and for the sake of illustration, these are few of the terms often used for describing
Algerian corsairs: the ‘Algerines’ were ‘ruffians,’ ‘thieves,’ ‘predators,’
‘blood-thirsty cutthroats,’ ‘swarm of marauders,’ ‘barbarians,’ ‘cowards,’ ‘plunderers,’
and ‘promoters of white slavery.’ Just about the last view one may say that
slavery was practiced on even larger scale in the United States. At a time
Decatur bragged that he had released 10 Americans that were
enslaved at Algiers—that’s all he could find—the Americans were holding more
than 1,000,000 black Africans in perpetual slavery!xxvii
Algiers, however, far from being
just a ‘piratical state’ that made out of piracy “a profitable national
industry,”xxviii was a country that was
evolving in a different culture. Its policies and institutions were shaped by a
different religion, different customs, and different circumstances that
happened not to be to the taste of the Americans. Like the Americans, however,
they were protective of their own interests.
Probably if Algerian sources going back to Ottoman rule, 1519-1830 could be
unveiled and investigated thoroughly, and to my modest knowledge no research
was done in this direction—at least in Anglo-American scholarly works, a different
approach might emerge. Can we then speak about a revisionist ‘trans-Mediterranean’
perspective in as much the same way as when we speak about the ‘trans-Atlantic’
approach in American history? The British historian H. G.
Barnby wrote about a “forgotten war” that took place between Algeria and the
United States.xxix
Assuming that such a war occurred,
regardless of its true dimensions, a search in its origins, course, and consequences
may be achieved objectively through the adoption of a two-fold perspective: American and Algerian,
the latter being of major concern to this paper.
Historians have often interpreted
the seizure of American vessels as deliberate Algerian aggression against the
United States. Barnby, for example, argued that the Americans “had absolutely
no hostile thoughts or intentions against Algiers,” and therefore, the captures
could be considered “an aggressive act against the United States of America.”xxx
Algerian corsairing practice during
the period 1783-1816 may not be blatantly brandished as anti-American acts.
Algerians and Americans were not operating in a vacuum: British naval restrictions on the rebellious
thirteen colonies and ensuing antagonism toward the emerging Republic of the
United States, religious antagonism that shaped Muslim-Christian Mediterranean
relations, power rivalries, and finally America’s own political, financial, and
naval weaknesses are major reasons that lay at the origin of those early strained
relations. Richard B. Parker,
president of the American
Association for Diplomatic Studies and former Ambassador to Algeria, 1974-78,
saw in Algerian practice of corsairing an anti-American attitude that, he
nonetheless argued, could be reasonably defended. He discarded any Algerian
animosity against Americans. Rather, he attributed it to naval hostilities in
the Mediterranean that resulted from Spanish incursions in North Africa.xxxi
Therefore, it may be more acceptable
to argue in favor of an Algerian reaction and accommodation with the then
prevailing international circumstances than anything else. Hence, one may
reasonably discard Anti-Americanism as a motive shaping those early contacts.
On the Algerian side, a significant
role was played by the British consul in stirring up troubles for the
Americans. Commercial competition and subsequent military conflicts that pitted
Great Britain against its former colonies found an extension into the
Mediterranean. After American independence in 1783, the British
Consul at Algiers made it known to the Dey and his fleet commanders that they
were at liberty to seize all ships sailing out of the North American ports
unless those had the latest British passports.xxxii
The Algerians, Dey and Rais alike,
believed that as soon as the Americans made peace with their “Father the King
of England,” the North American prisoners would be released. The role of the
British consul in stimulating actions of Algerian corsairs against the United
States was part of a wider British strategy that aimed at weakening the
emerging American Republic. A similar policy existed in Canada where the
British Governor General attempted to agitate the North American native tribes
against the Confederation government too.
Lacking the support of a strong
naval power, American trade in the Mediterranean was, moreover, affected by a
deeply-rooted religious antagonism between Muslims and Christians that can be
traced back to the Crusades. With the relative decline in Middle Ages crusading
ardor, that religious hostility evolved to a complicated pattern
of corsairing, ransom, and tribute that shaped diplomatic relations between
countries on both sides of the Mediterranean.xxxiii
After the fall of Grenada in 1492
and the massive expulsion of Muslims from Spain in the early
sixteenth century, religious warfare
escalated and Muslim-Christian hostilities were carried to the sea.xxxiv
The Spanish also took warfare to the
shores of North Africa and conquered many Algerian cities including Oran,
Algiers, and Bedjaia. The building of a strong navy was the answer of the Muslim
Turks who rushed to the rescue of their brethren Muslims of Algiers who asked for their assistance. Thus, for the
next three centuries to come, naval clashes between Algiers and the Christian
states went unabated, and corsairing in a sense was institutionalized and internationalized.xxxv
For that matter, if piracy it was,
Christian ‘pirates’ were, by no means, less important than the so-called
‘Algerine pirates’-the pirate entity of Malta, for example, was eloquently outstanding.xxxvi
By the end of the eighteenth century,
that naval practice was common on both flanks of the Mediterranean.
Furthermore, the major European powers manipulated it to their own advantages.
Great Britain, for example, did not hesitate to entertain itself with the idea
that the power of Algiers might be beneficial if used to check and weaken
American economic expansion in the Mediterranean. Lord Sheffield
plainly expressed that British view: “It is not probable the American States
will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be in the
interest of the great maritime powers to protect them there from the Barbary
States.”xxxvii
That exactly what Great Britain did:
by the Peace Treaty of 1783, the Americans were deprived of their British
shield in the Mediterranean and the different treaties with the Christian
powers did not guarantee protection for American trading interests in the
Mediterranean.
Accordingly, it happened that the
commercial activities of the newly independent Americans were caught in the
midst of a deeply rooted religious hatred that found expression in various
naval clashes between Algiers and the Christian states and which was
manipulated by the great powers to their own ends. In sum, the prevailing
religious animosity and power rivalry in the Mediterranean did not serve American
interests either.
It would be perhaps more accurate
also to attribute those late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries events
to the American government itself. Its naval and financial weaknesses, added to
its geographical remoteness, did not permit it a quick and effective adaptation
to Mediterranean prevailing conditions. Financially, it was not until 1794 that
the American Congress could provide the necessary funds for
negotiating a peace treaty. Hence, the capture of American ships might more be
imputed to the reluctance of the American government to adhere to international
law and custom as they existed then and negotiation of peace treaties on the
basis of tribute than to any particular aggressiveness towards the United
States on the side of Algiers. Nonetheless,capture aroused a cry of indignation
among Americans who, proud as they were about their independence, considered it
national humiliation. In sum, one may conclude that Algiers’ practice of
corsairing during the period 1783-1816 may not be considered as hostile action
against the United States. Corsairing was a Mediterranean practice and by no
means could
it be seen as an Algerian
particularity. It resulted from complicated international political,
commercial, naval, as well as religious considerations and impregnated the
whole Mediterranean Basin for a period of over than 300 years.
Yet, the Americans mistakenly attribute it to Algerian corsairs solely and tag
it ‘piracy.’ Moreover, the 9/11 events led to further distortions whereby corsairs became synonymous of terrorists.xxxviii
When corsairing is taken out of its
historical context and looked at through the lenses of a 21st century terminology, no doubt
distortions and biases would ensue.
REFERENCES
i-See for example the works of Dr.
Brahim Harouni, ‘The American Duplicity vis-à-vis the Colonial Problem of the
Maghreb during the Second World War,’ in Revue Sciences Humaines , n° 20, December 2003, pp. 49-57
and ‘The Use of Ultra for the Safe Passage of the Anglo-American Expeditionary
Forces to North Africa in 1942,’ in Revue Sciences Humaines, n° 26, December 2006, pp.121-127.
ii-Shultz, Richard H. And Andreas
Vogt. “It’s War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine
of Preemption,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 15: 1 (Spring 2003), pp.
12-4; Randal K. James, “The Islamist Challenge in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Research Report, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, USA, April 1996, pp.
22-9.
iii-Privateers are privately-owned
armed vessel whose owners were commissioned by belligerent nations to carry
naval warfare. Such naval commissions or authorizations are calledletters of marquee . “Privateer,” Microsoft
Encarta Premium 2005. (accessed 22 February 2008).
iv-Lewis Hertslet, A Complete
Collection of the Treaties and Conventions, and Reciprocal Regulations, at
Present Subsisting Between Great Britain and Foreign Powers. Vol. I. (London:
Henry Butter Worth, 1827), pp. 65-66; for all treaties between Algiers and
Great Britain see pp. 58-88. The British benefited from numerous commercial
advantages including the monopoly of wheat purchase from certain tribes and
arms’ sales. The latter was strictly denied to their rivals the French. For details see
Mahfoud Kaddache, L'Algérie durant la période Ottomane (Alger: Office des Publications
Universitaires, 1992), pp. 223.
v-Article VIII of the treaty of 1778
stipulates: “The most Christian King will employ his good Offices and
Interposition with the Regency of Algiers in order to provide as fully and efficaciously
as possible for the Benefit, Conveniency and Safety of the said United
States....” Thomas B. Wait, ed., Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of
Congress, vol. 2 (Boston, MA: Thomas B. Wait, 1820-21), pp. 63-4.
vi-The commented provisions of the
treaty appear in Thomas G. Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Policy:
Documents and Essays, vol. 1: To 1914 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1978), pp. 48-51.
vii-James L. Cathcart, The Captives:
Eleven Years a Prisoner in Algiers, compiled by his Daughter, J. B. Newkirk (La
Porte, Indiana: Herald, 1899), p. 5.
viii-See for example article VI of
the Anglo-Algerian treaty of 1682. Hertslet, Collection of Treaties and
Conventions, p. 59.
ix-The full account of the story from
capture to release can be found in H. G. Barnby, The Prisoners of Algiers: An
Account of the Forgotten American-Algerian War, 1785-1797 (London: Oxford University Press,
1966).
x-Richard Leiby, “Terrorists by another
Name: The Barbary Pirates,” Washington Post,15 October 2001, p. C01.
xi-Walter Lowrie and Mathew C.
Clarke, eds., American State Papers, Class I: Documents, Legislative and
Executive, of the Congress of the United States: Foreign Relations, 1789-1828 (Washington, D. C.: Gales and
Seaton, 1832-1861), 1:418, Captain O’Brien to the President of United States, November 5, 1793.
xii-Richard Peters, ed., Public
Statutes at Large of the United States of America,from the Organization of Government
in 1789 to March 3, 1845, vol. VIII: Treatiesbetween the United States of America
and Foreign Nations, 1778-1845(Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1867), pp.
133-137.
xiii-American writings refer to
‘protection racket’ and ‘blackmail money’ rather than ‘tribute’ and ‘ransom.’
For this approach see for example Rand H. Fishbein, “Echoes from the Barbary
Coast: History of U.S. Military Actions against Pirates,” The National Interest,
65-66: 66 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 47-51.
xiv-For further details see John B.
Wolfe, Algiers under the Turks, 1500-1830 (New York/London: W. W. Norton,
1979), pp. 309-13.
xv-Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic
History of the American People, 10th ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 65.
xvi-The treaty with Portugal
permitted Algerian corsairs to sail through Gibraltar to the Atlantic and to
seize another 11 American ships in the single Fall of 1793.
xvii-Journal of the House of
Representatives of the United States, Thursday, January 2, 1794.
xviii-Marshall Smelser, “The Passage
of the Naval Act of 1794,” Military Affairs
, 22: 1 (Spring 1958), pp. 1-12.
xix-William Shaler, Sketches of
Algiers: Political, Historical, and Civil: Containing an Account of the
Geography, Population, Government, Revenues, Commerce, Agriculture, Arts, Civil
Institutions, Tribes, Manners,
Languages, and Recent Political History of that Country(Boston: Cummings, Hiliard and
Company, 1826), pp. 121-22.
xx-Ibid., p. 120.
xxi-As cited in Ray W. Irwin, The
Diplomatic Relations of the United Stateswith the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel
Hill, N.C., 1931), p. 195.
xxii-The document can be found in
Shaler, Sketches of Algiers, pp. 118-19.
xxiii-For the circumstances
surrounding Lear’s departure see, Thomas B. Wait, ed.,State Papers and Publick Documents
of the United States, From the Accession of GeorgeWashington to the Presidency,
Exhibiting a Complete View of our Foreign Relations sincethat Time, 3rd edition (Boston, MA:
T. B. Wait, 1819), 9:126-136, Letter from Mr. Lear,Consul General at Algiers, to the
Secretary of State, July 29, 1812.
xxiv-American State Papers, Naval
Affairs, 1:396, Naval Operation against the Barbary Powers in 1815: Stephen
Decatur to Secretary of the Navy, July 5, 1815.
xxv-Public Statutes at Large, 8:224-227.
xxvi-Examples include: Ray W. Irwin,
The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers,
1776-1816 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931); Frederick
Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of
North Africa(New York: Oxford University Press,
2006); and Glenn Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder:The Barbary Wars and the Birth of
the U.S. Navy (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963).
xxvii-For a sample see Ralph P.
Locke, “Cutthroats and Casbah Dancers, Muezzins and Timeless Sands: Musical Images
of the Middle East,” 19th-Century Music, 22: 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 20-53.
xxviii-Bailey, Diplomatic History, p.
64.
xxix-Barnby, The Prisoners of
Algiers.
xxx-Ibid., p. 11.
xxxi-Richard B. Parker,
‘Anti-American Attitudes in the Arab
World,’ The Annals, AAPSS
, 497, May 1988, pp. 46-7.
xxxii-Cathcart, The Captives, p. 4.
xxxiii-James A. Field, America and
the Mediterranean World, 1772-1882 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1969), p. 29.
xxxiv-Stephen Clissold, “The
Expulsion of the Moriscos, 1609–1614,” History Today, 28: 12 (1978), pp. 817–824.
xxxv-The American approach to piracy
in the Mediterranean is a one-sided approach. It tends to make of piracy an
exclusively Algerian matter. Thus, Algiers was blamed for the ill-fated
American adventures in the Mediterranean.
xxxvi-For a substantial study about
piracy on the other side of the Mediterraneansee, Mouley
Belhamissi, Les captifs algériens et l’Europe chrétienne, 1518-1830 (Alger: Entreprise Nationale du
Livre, 1988); see also Marisa Huber, “Holy Wars andPiratical Governments: Barbary
Corsairs (With a Comparative Look at MalteseCorsairs)”, 2004. (Accessed 18 May
2008). http://www.daviddfriedman.comAcademicCourse_Pages/legal_systems
xxxvii-As cited in Irwin, Diplomatic
Relations, pp. 24-25.
xxxviii-Paul A. Silverstein, “The
New Barbarians: Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier,” The New
Centennial Review , 5: 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 179-212.
